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he  Single  European  Act  defines the  internal  market  as  'an  area  without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is  ensured'. 
There are at present 12  tax territories in the Community, each with its own tax 
system. In the nature of things the national rules take a unilateral approach to the 
tax  treatment of business  activity.  This  frequently leaves  cross-border activity 
worse off than domestic activity, and often leads to double taxation which is  an 
added burden on the firms involved. Examples: 
•  Example 1 
A  company  wishing  to  operate  in  another  Member  State  may  set  up  a 
subsidiary there.  It naturally plans  to recover  its  investment in  the form of 
dividends paid by the foreign subsidiary to the parent. This is  where the tax 
problems begin. In extreme cases  the profits of a foreign subsidiary may be 
subject to a threefold taxation: 
0  to corporation tax  charged  on the subsidiary's profits in  the subsidiary's 
country; 
D  to  withholding  tax  charged  on  distributed  profits  in  the  subsidiary's 
country; and 
D  to corporation tax on the parent company's profits, which incorporate the 
profits distributed by the subsidiary. 
Bilateral  or unilateral  measures  have  been  taken  to minimize such  extreme 
forms of multiple taxation, but companies operating internationally are still at a 
clear disadvantage as  compared with their competitors who are taxed only in 
their  own  country.  Obviously  such  a  situation  can  discourage  firms  from 
operating in another Member State, and thus seriously hamper the emergence 
of a single market. 
•  Example 2  . 
Rather  than  setting  up a  subsidiary a  company  may  choose  to  commence 
operations  in  another  Member  State  by  means  of a  merger  with  a  local 
company, or another similar link-up such as a transfer of assets or exchange of 
shares. The commercial advantages are self-evident: 
D  the two sides can each make use of the other's distribution system, which is 
at home with the special features of the market to be developed; 
D  transport  and  storage  costs  can  be  lowered  by  relocating  sections  of 
production activity whose output was in any case  intended for export; 
D  large  areas  of  research  and  development  can  be  coordinated,  so  as  to 
secure a division of labour and savings in costs. 
As  the laws of the individual Member States  stand at  present, a cross-border 
merger will as a rule expose a transferring company's hidden reserves to tax -I 
a disadvantage which is enough to deter interested companies from this form 
of cooperation at  European level. Mergers inside a single Member State,  on 
the other hand,  are  u~ually covered  by special  rules which allow tax  to be 
deferred. 
•  Example 3 
Where different national tax authorities assessing a company with international 
operations disagree about the size and justification of transfer prices within the 
group, it can happen ill extreme cases that the tax authorities in State A refuse 
to accept a price paid by the subsidiary in that country to its parent in State B, 
and  consequently  reassess  the  subsidiary's  profits  upwards,  while  the  tax 
authorities in State B do not make the corresponding downward adjustment in 
the parent company's q1se. This means that even though the subsidiary cannot 
offset the full price paid to the parent so as to reduce its own tax liability, the 
parent  must  enter  the  entire  amount  in  its  balance  sheet,  without taking 
account  of  the  adjustment  made  on  the  subsidiary's  side,  and  pay  tax 
accordingly. 
The solution currently ~ncorporated into double taxation conventions, in line 
with Article 25  of the OECD Model Convention, is  a procedure for reaching 
mutual  agreement  between  States;  it  has  the  serious  drawback  that  if 
agreement is not reached the amount of the adjustment continues to be taxed 
twice. And mutual agreement proceedings frequently last several years, which 
can  cause liquidity problems particularly for ~mailer businesses. 
Three new tax measures adopted by the Council 
On  23  July  1990  the  Co1-1ncil  of  the  European  Communities  adopted  three 
measures in the field of direct company taxation which had been proposed by the 
Commission with a view to solving these problems on a Community-wide basis. 
The measures are: 
•  a Directive on the comrrion system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, 
transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different 
Member States (the 'MJrgers Directive');  1 
•  a Directive on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent 
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (the 'Parent/subsidiary 
Directive');2  ' 
•  a Convention on the elimination of double taxation  in connection with the 
adjustment of profits of ilSSociated enterprises (the 'Arbitration Convention').3 
The  Council discussed the
1 three measures as  a package;  the Commission had 
given them priority in its  White Paper on completing the internal market, and 
I 
1  Directive 901434/EEC:  OJ  L 225,  20.8.1990, p.  1. 
2  Directive 90/435/EEC:  OJ  L 225,  20.8.1990, p.  6. 
3  Convention 901436/EEC:  OJ L'225, 20.8.1990,  p.  10. 
___ _____________j repeatedly drawn attention to their urgency. One of the main objectives of the 
single market is  to enable firms to operate throughout the Community without 
hindrance from tax borders or tax rules. The economic advantages to be secured 
from the single market rest primarily on an  expansion of cross-border business 
activity  within  the  Community.  The  Council's  adoption  of  the  Commission 
proposals is  an  important step towards the achievement of this goal. 
A brief look at the new legislation 
•  The  Mergers Directive. The Mergers Directive was  originally proposed by the 
Commission  in  1969.1  As  its  full title says,  it aims  at  a 'common system  of 
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of 
shares concerning companies of different Member States'. 
In the event of a cross-border merger - and the same applies to the other 
transactions covered  - the Directive ensures tax neutrality in three ways. 
D  A merger must not give rise to 'any taxation of capital gains calculated by 
reference  to  the  difference  between  the  real  values  of the  assets  and 
liabilities transferred and their values for tax purposes', that is to say on the 
hidden  reserves.  To  prevent  this  happening,  while  at  the  same  time 
protecting the tax  interests of the State of the transferring company, the 
Directive adopts the approach that the receiving company will continue to 
have a permanent establishment in the State  of the transferring company 
whose own balance sheet will continue to show the transferred assets  at 
their original book values. 
D  Any gains accruing to the receiving company from the cancellation of a 
holding in the transferring company is  not to be liable to any taxation. 
D  The allotment of securities representing the capital of the receiving com-
pany to the shareholders of the transferring company is not of itself to give 
rise to any taxation on the gain. It is of course stipulated that a shareholder 
in the transferring company is to declare the new shares in his tax returns at 
the same value as the holding cancelled in the course of the merger. 
•  The  Parent/subsidiary  Directive.  This  Directive,  whose  full  title  is  'Council 
Directive on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent 
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States', was likewise first put 
forward in its original form in 1969.2 
Its purpose is to prevent the triple taxation of the profits of foreign subsidiaries 
in the Community which was described at the beginning of this paper. It does 
so by requiring the State of the parent company either to refrain from taxing 
profits  distributed  by the  foreign  subsidiary  or to deduct tax  already  paid 
1  OJ C 39,  22.3.1969, p.  1. 
2  OJ  C 39,  22.3.1969,  p.  7. abroad  up to the  limit of the amount of the corresponding domestic tax; 
neither the  State  of the  subsidiary  nor the  State  of the  parent  is  to  levy 
withholding tax. 
1 
•  The Arbitration Convemion. The third measure adopted by the Council on 23 
July provides for the introduction of an  arbitration procedure to resolve the 
differences of opinion of the kind described above that may arise between the 
tax authorities of diffe~erit Member States when they reassess transfer prices 
between associated enterprises for tax purposes. 
; 
I 
It was  in  fact already  ~ossible to avoid double taxation  here by following a 
mutual  agreement  prdcedure  laid  down  in  Article  25  of the  OECD  Model 
Corwention. But the bjlateral conventions do not require the tax authorities 
involved to eliminate double taxation,  but only discuss the matter between 
them; and, as has already been said, mutual agreement proceedings can often 
last  for  years.  The  Community  arbitration  procedure  on  the  other  hand 
requires that the double taxation be finally eliminated within not more than 
three years of the initia
1tion of proceedings. 
Application of the 11ew measures in the Member States 
The two Directives must under Article 189 be transposed into national law, which 
will require appropriate legislation in all 12 Member States, and the Convention 
has to be ratified by the  l~gislatures of the individual States. 
•  Article 8 of the Parent/subsidiary Directive requires Member States  to bring 
into force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative provisions  necessary to 
transpose  the Directive into domestic law before 1 January 1992;  there are 
temporary exceptions f<;>r  Greece, Germany and Portugal. 
•  Like the Parent/subsidiaty Directive, the Mergers Directive is to be transposed 
into the domestic law o\ all the Member States before 1 January 1992. The only 
exception  is  Portugal,  .which  is  allowed  one  extra  year  to  implement the 
provisions concerning transfers of assets and exchanges of shares. 
•  The Community arbitration procedure was  originally proposed as  a directive, 
like the other two measures.
1  In the course of discussion the Member States 
agreed to embody the a~bitration procedure in a multilateral convention under 
Article 220 of the EEC  T~eaty. 
i 
The  Convention  requir~s  ratification  by  the  legislatures  of the  individual 
Member States, so that there is no fixed date for its entry into force. Obviously 
it is desirable that it should be applied from 1 January 1992 onward like the two 
Directives. 
0  1  OJ C 301,  21.12.1976,  p.  4. The measures in detail 
1.  THE  MERGERS  DIRECTIVE 
(a)  Scope 
The Directive is to apply to four types of transaction in which companies from two 
or more Member States are involved: 
•  mergers, 
•  divisions, 
•  transfers of assets, and 
•  exchanges of shares. 
The Directive covers all companies set up under the law of a Member State and 
subject to corporation tax in a Member State. 
Figure 1 TRANSFER OF THE  ENTIRE ACTIVITY 
Figure 2 
•  The definition of 'merger' borrows heavily from the wording of the proposal 
for a 10th  Company Law  Directive,
1  which  however deals  only with  public 
limited companies.  · 
•  Cross-border divisions ryave not yet been dealt with in a Community directive.· 
The sixth Company La~ Directive2  is  concerned with purely national transac-
tions. 
I 
1  Proposal for a  10th  Council Directive based on Article 54(3)(g)  of the Treaty concerning 
cross-border mergers of public limited companies,  14  january 1985:  Supplement 3185  -
Bull.  EC  (with explanatory memorandum); OJ  C 23,  25.1.1985,  p.  11  (without explanatory 
memorandum). 
2  Sixth Council Directive 821891/EEC of 17 December 1982  based on Article 54(3)(g)  of the 
Treaty,  concerning· the  d\vision  of  public  limited  liability  companies:  OJ  L 378, 
31.12.1982,  p. 47. 
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In  bot~. mergers  and  divisions  all  the assets  and  liabilities  are  transferred 
and the existing company or companies are  dissolved. Shares  in the receiv-
ing company  B are  allotted  to the  previous  shareholders  in  the dissolved 
company A. 
•  A merger or division is fundamentally different from a transfer of assets.  Even 
where one company transfers all of its activity to another it continues to exist as 
a legal entity; there is no universal succession in title, but merely a special case 
of singular succession. The new shares in the receiving company are taken by 
the  transferring  company  itself.  Once  it  has  transferred  all  its  activity  the 
transferring  company  becomes  a  holding  company,  whose  assets  consist 
entirely of a stake in the receiving company. But  the  transfer  need  not be  a transfer  of the  entire activity.  There  is  an 
improvement  in  the  tax  treatment  of the  transfer  even  of a  branch  of a 
company's activity, defined as  'all the assets  and  liabilities of a division of a 
company which from an  organizational point of view constitute an  indepen-
dent business, that is to say an entity capable of functioning by its own means'. 
•  The provisions on 'exchange of snares' in the Directive are aimed at the case 
where a  company  in  one Member State  acquires  from  the  existing  share-
holders of a company in another Member State a majority of the voting rights 
in that company. In exchange it issues them shares in the acquiring company. 
' 
(b)  Legal consequences  ~ 
I 
The central principle of the Mergers Directive is that after the merger or transfer a 
permanent establishment belonging to the receiving company in the State of the 
transferring company remains available for taxation in that State. This enables the 
State  to  refrain  from  taxing the  hidden  reserve  element  in the  assets  of the 
transferring company at the time of the merger or transfer, without thereby losing 
its  entitlement to tax  them  at  any  later  stage.  Thus  the Directive  assumes  -
though it does not say  so ;in  so  many words  - that the State of the acquired 
company  or  transferring  company,  which  has  now  become  the  State  of  a 
permanent establishment only, continues to  be  entitled to tax the transferred 
assets and liabilities later; double taxation agreements will then apply (see Article 
7 of the OECD Model Convention). 
The receiving company also steps into the place of the transferring company with 
regard to the continuation of provisions and (tax-free) reserves in the accounts of 
the permanent establishment. Where in a Member State mergers, divisions and 
transfers  between  domestic  companies  allow  the  losses  of  the  transferring 
company to be offset again'st the profits of the receiving company, the same will 
apply to corresponding multinational transactions covered by the Directive. Any 
gain on transfer made by the receiving company as a result of the cancellation of a 
stake held by it in the transferring company will not be subject to taxation either. 
The  Member  States  may  derogate  from  this  provision  where  the  receiving 
company's holding in the capital  of the transferring company does not exceed 
25%. 
The  legal  consequences of an  exchange of shares  are dealt with together with 
some  of the  legal  conseq'uences  of mergers  and  divisions.  The  allotment of 
securities to the sharehold~rs of the acquired company which is  necessary in an 
exchange of shares is not to give rise to any taxation. Member States are free to 
make it a condition for neutral treatment of this kind that the shareholders of the 
acquired company must not attribute to the securities  received  as  part of the 
merger, division or exchange of shares a value for tax purposes higher than that of 
the securities they have transferred (book value linkage). The intention here is to 
ensure that the Member States will be able to tax increases in value later. This will 
apply primarily to firms with  holdings in  the acquired company,  but in  some 
Member States to private persons as  well. 
I As  in  cases  of merger or division, a cash  payment of 10% is  permitted  in  an 
exchange of shares. This does not affect the tax neutrality of the transaction. 
Where only a branch of activity is transferred the legal consequences are the same 
as  for mergers and divisions. 
A  special  case  arises  where the transferring company has  a permanent estab-
lishment situated in a third Member State. The merger or transfer will make this a 
permanent  establishment of the  receiving  company,  so  that the  State  of the 
transferring  company  permanently  loses  the  possibility  of taxing  any  losses 
previously deducted by the establishment if it should subsequently show a profit. 
The Directive therefore permits the State of the transferring company to levy such 
tax at the time of the merger or other transaction. 
To secure the adoption of the Mergers Directive by the Council it was  vital that 
the Member States should be able to agree on an abuse clause. The abuse clause 
included allows Member States to withdraw or to refuse to apply the concessions 
provided for in the Directive where the transaction is undertaken for the purpose 
of tax evasion or tax avoidance. This provision is  to be interpreted strictly, and 
should be invoked only in genuine cases of abuse. There might be such a case, for 
example, where the shares received are disposed of shortly after a transfer or an 
exchange of shares. The provision also makes allowance for Member States' fear 
that  the  transactions  facilitated  by  the  Directive  might  be  misused  to  evade 
worker participation laws. 
2.  THE  PARENT/SUBSIDIARY DIRECTIVE 
(a)  Scope 
The  Parent/subsidiary  Directive applies  to  'distributions of profits  received  by 
companies which  come from their subsidiaries  of other Member States',  and 
'distributions of profits by companies to companies of other Member States  of 
which they are subsidiaries'. 
A 'company of a Member State' must be a company in one of the forms listed in 
the Annex to the Directive. They are all joint stock companies, as in the case of the 
Mergers Directive. 
The  status  of parent company is  to be attributed at  least to any company of a 
Member State which has a minimum holding of 25 % in the capital of a company 
of another Member State  (the subsidiary). The  use  of the words 'at least'  and 
'minimum' is intended to make it clear that Member States are free to provide for 
a privileged parent/subsidiary relationship even below this minimum holding. In 
reality  some  Member  States  have  already  granted  the  same  corporation  tax 
privilege where the  holding is  lower, on the  basis  of bilateral  agreements  or unilateral  rules.1  Naturally  the  Directive  does  not  seek  to  change  the  legal 
position here to the disadvantage of companies. Member States are also free to 
replace this criterion by that of a holding of voting rights. 
(b)  Legal consequences 
I 
The  legal  consequences of the  ParenUsubsidiary  Directive for distributions of 
profits by a subsidiary to a parent company resident for tax purposes in another 
Member State are as follows. 
I 
•  No double taxation.  A~ far as  c~rporation tax  is  concerned  any (economic) 
double taxation of distributed profits is to be avoided by the State of the parent 
company, which can either exempt such profits from tax or, when assessing tax 
on  the  parent company,  to authorize the  parent company to deduct 'that 
fraction of the corporarion tax paid by the subsidiary which relates to those 
profits ... up to the limit of the amount of the corresponding domestic tax'. 
•  Abolition of withholding tax.  In the State of the subsidiary, profits distributed 
by the subsidiary to its parent company are to be exempt from withholding tax, 
at least where the parent company holds a minimum of 25 % of the capital of 
the subsidiary. 
During  discussion  of the  ParenUsubsidiary  Directive  in  the  Council  the 
elimination of withholding tax was for a long time the biggest obstacle in the 
way of the unanimous decision required by Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. 
I 
By reason of its differentiated system of corporation tax, Germany is allowed to 
retain a withholding tax:of 5% as long as the difference between the two rates 
of corporation tax amounts to at least 11  percentage points, but not beyond 
mid-1996.  Portugal is allowed to retain a withholding tax of 15% for the first 
five years and 10% for the next three; this was necessary for purely budgetary 
reasons, as Portugal is heavily dependent on revenue from withholding taxes. 
This  eight-year  period •  can  be  extended  by  a  unanimous  decision  of the 
Council. Greece is permitted to levy a withholding tax on profits distributed to 
parent companies of other Member States for so long as  it does not charge 
corporation tax on distributed profits. 
3.  THE COMMUNITY ARBITRATION CONVENTION 
The  Community  Arbitration  Convention  provides  for  the  introduction  of an 
arbitration procedure in order to avoid double taxation where prices charged in 
international clearing oper,ations between associated enterprises are reassessed 
by the tax authorities. The :geographical scope of the Convention is  restricted to 
1  The  Netherlands grant this inter-company tax concession where the holding is as  low as 
5 %.  Germany has  set the  double taxation  agreement exemption  unilaterally at 10 %, 
regardless  of the level in  the relevant double taxation  agreement (Article 26  (7)  of the 
corporation  tax  law),  whit~ Belgium  avoids  double  taxation  without  laying  down  a 
minimum holding.  1 enterprises of any of the contracting States, and thus to the Community. In order 
to  include adjustments of prices  charged  between  an  enterprise  and  its  per-
manent establishments, a permanent establishment situated in another contrac-
ting State is deemed to be an  enterprise of the State in which it is situated. 
The Convention is to apply to the taxes currently levied on profits in the individual 
Member States.  It is  explicitly stated  that  it will also  apply to any identical or 
similar taxes imposed later. 
In line with Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Convention, the Convention provides 
that the prices agreed  between associated  enterprises can  be adjusted for tax 
purposes  if they differ from those which would  be  charged  under the  same 
conditions between independent enterprises (the 'arm's length' principle). The 
same holds for adjustments relating to a permanent establishment. 
The  main purpose of the Convention is  to resolve cases  of double taxation  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  Tax  authorities  are  accordingly  required  to  inform  the 
enterprise beforehand where they intend to make  an  adjustment of the  kind 
covered  by  the  Convention.  This  will  allow  the  intended  adjustment  to  be 
discussed with the associated enterprise and with the contracting State in which it 
is situated, and if all parties are in agreement the matter need go no further. The 
date on which the tax authority announces its intention of making an adjustment 
is also important for some of the time-limits governing later steps. 
If either of the enterprises does not accept the intended adjustment, because it 
feels it is not in accordance with the arm's length principle, a two-stage procedure 
can  be set in motion. 
•  In  the  first  place  there  is  a  mutual  agreement  procedure,  which  broadly 
corresponds to the procedure laid down  in  Article 25  of the OECD  Model 
Convention. The purpose of this procedure is to arrive at an  agreed solution 
which eliminates double taxation.  · 
•  The second stage provided for here goes beyond Article 25 in the OECD Model 
Convention and the bilateral agreements based on it; it comes into play if the 
mutual agreement procedure fails to eliminate the double taxation within two 
years  of the date  on which the objection was  first  lodged. The  competent 
authorities of the  States  involved are  then  required  to set  up an  'advisory 
commission' immediately. In the arbitration procedure which follows the sole 
function of the advisory commission is to deliver its opinion on the elimination 
of the double taxation in question. 
The advisory commission is to consist of its chairman, two representatives of 
each competent authority concerned (the authorities may agree to reduce this 
to one each), and an even number of independent persons of standing. These 
latter must be nationals of a contracting State (not necessarily one of the States 
concerned) and be resident within the Community. They must be competent 
and  independent. The  chairman,  elected from outside their number by the 
other  members,  must  in  addition  possess  the  qualifications  required  for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in his country or be a jurisconsult of 
recognized competence. These rules ensure that the total number of members will be an odd number (two plus two representatives of tax authorities, plus an 
even number of independent persons, plus the chairman), so as to avoid a tied 
vote. 
Six months after the advisory commission was convened it delivers its opinion. 
The  competent authorities party to the proceedings then  have  another six 
months to agree a solution which will eliminate the double taxation. They may 
opt for a solution different from that recommended by the advisory commis-
sion.  Only if they fail  to  reach  agreement does  the commission's  opinion 
become binding. 
The Convention also settles a question often raised  in connection with mutual 
agreement procedures under double taxation conventions, and does so to the 
advantage of the enterprises involved: the fact that a tax assessment has become 
final  does not prevent the mutual agreement and  arbitration procedures from 
being set in motion. 
The  Convention's objective of eliminating double taxation  is  considered to be 
achieved if the profits are included in the computation of taxable profits in one 
State only, or if  the tax chargeable in one State is offset against the tax chargeable 
in the other. 
A Member State  is  not obliged to take part in  mutual agreement or arbitration 
proceedings  if one of the enterprises concerned  is  guilty of a tax  offence for 
which it is  liable to a 'serious penalty'. The concept of a serious penalty takes 
different forms in different Member States, so that it was found advisable to leave 
more precise  definitions to the Member  Stat~s,\vho have  supplied  unilateral 
declarations attached to the Convention. The intentjon was to make it clear that 
only major offences are caught by this provision. 
Where, at the time that the mutual agreement procedure might be initiated, or 
before the advisory commission  is  set  up,  legal  or administrative proceedings 
have  resulted in a final  ruling that such a serious offence has  been committed, 
either of the authorities concerned may refuse to go ahead with the procedure. 
Once  arbitration  proceedings  have  been  initiated,  however,  the  position  is 
different: if at the time they are initiated or thereafter there are other proceedings 
pending in which a ruling is  sought that one of the enterprises concerned has 
committed an offence which might incur a serious penalty, the mutual agreement 
or  arbitration  proceedings  may  be  stayed  only  by  a  joint  decision  of  both 
authorities ('the competent authorities may stay ...  '). 
The Convention is  concluded for a period of five years.  Six  months before the 
expiry of that period, the contracting States are to decide whether it should be 
extended. There is thus no automatic extension. 
Practical effects of the new measures 
•  Of the three measures described the Parent/subsidiary Directive will probably 
be felt most rapidly and directly in practice. The disappearance of withholding 
taxes throughout the Community, leaving aside for a moment the temporary 
transitional arrangements for individual countries, will immediately produce an  appreciable  reduction  in  the  burdens  on  the  enterprises  affected.  The 
avoidance  of the  reimbursement  proceedings  which  were  often  necessary 
under previous double taxation practice, and which could be costly in terms of 
time  and  administrative  effort,  should  be  of particular  benefit to  smaller 
businesses. 
The concessions required by the Directive will be especially useful to compan-
ies  in those Member States which do not have a network of double taxation 
agreements with all the other Member States.1 
Between  parents and  subsidiaries  in  the Community, there will now be  no 
further  role  for  tactical  group  structures  whereby  holding  companies  are 
interposed in order to take advantage of the lowest rate of withholding tax on 
profits distributed by foreign subsidiaries. 
•  The Mergers Directive is by no means less important than the Parent/subsidiary 
Directive, although because of the reorganization measures it covers its effects 
will not be felt so rapidly. 
While the Parent/subsidiary Directive merely represents the ultimate solution 
to a problem which had already in part been resolved on the basis of bilateral 
agreements, the new tax arrangements for cross-border mergers break new 
ground. As the law in the individual Member States stood previously, mergers 
and  similar  transactions  which  took  place  across  borders  meant  that  the 
hidden  reserves  of a  transferring  company  were  exposed  to  tax.  The  tax 
burden  thereby  incurred  made  such  transactions  almost  impossible  in 
practice. 
The Directive will apply straight away to transfers of assets and exchanges of 
shares,  for which  there  is  already  a  basis  in  company  law.  The  Directive 
establishes the tax environment for mergers and divisions, but here there is as 
yet no basis in Community company law. The European Parliament has not yet 
delivered an  opinion on the Commission's proposal for a 10th Company Law 
Directive, on cross-border mergers of public limited companies, which was 
submitted on 14 January 1985. The Council is still considering the revised draft 
of the Statute for a European  company;2  a merger of two companies from 
different  Member  States  would  be  one  of the  main  ways  of setting  up a 
European company. 
The Commission feels that the adoption and entry into force of the Statute for 
a European company by 1 January 1993 is vital to the completion of the internal 
market.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  both  of these  cases  the  necessary  tax 
legislation has  been enacted before the company legislation, which is  a new 
departure  in  European  legal  history.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that following  the 
breakthrough on direct taxation the Member States will now be prepared to fill 
the gap  in company law. 
1  There are no double taxation agreements between Greece on the one hand and Denmark, 
Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg or Portugal on the other; between Portugal and Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands or Ireland; or between Spain and Ireland. 
2  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European company: COM(89) 268 
final - SYN 218 and SYN 219,  25.8.1989; 0] C 263,  16.10.1989,  p.  41. •  The  Community Arbitration Convention for the first time establishes a pro-
cedure which requires tax authorities to arrive at a solution which eliminates 
double taxation.  In  contrast  to  the  position  which  held  previously  under 
double taxation  conventions,  the company affected will  be  involved in the 
proceedings from an early stage, and will thus be able to put forward its own 
position. The length of the proceedings will now also be restricted, so that it 
will no longer be possible for a disagreement to hang in the balance for many 
years, with all the extra costs that that entails. And smaller businesses, which 
do  not  have  the  staff  to  deal  with  the  frequently  demanding  and  time-
consuming area  of double taxation  cases,  will  now be  more  ready  to  risk 
stepping over the border and taking advantage of the single market. 
While the Commission has the right and the duty to monitor compliance with 
the Directives in the individual Member States, the same does not apply to the 
Convention.  It should also  be  noted that the Convention does not confer 
jurisdiction on the Court of justice of the European Communities. 
In the longer term it can be expected that the Member States' experience with 
the  new  Arbitration  Convention,  which  merely  lays  down  a  procedural 
framework, will lead to the development of substantive rules of Community 
law on transfer pricing between associated enterprises. 
All  three  measures  will  also  allow investors  from  non~member States  to take 
advantage of the tax  reliefs  they provide for.  Such  a non-Community investor 
would have to operate through a Community company to which the  relevant 
measure applies, and this company would have to be cooperating with a company 
in  another  Member  State.  The  question  where  the  shareholder  who  stands 
behind  the  company  is  based  is  irrelevant  to  the  application  of  the  new 
Community tax measures. 
The adoption of the new tax measures is an important step towards the European 
single market of  1992. Further steps are needed in order to remove completely the 
tax  obstacles  which  still  exist,  so  as  to  achieve  the goal  of free  cooperation 
between  businesses throughout the Community, unhindered by tax consider-
ations. 
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